Does Thomistic Trinitarianism entail a logical contradiction regarding the Son's being necessarily metaphysically independent and yet dependent via the human nature?
Thomistic Trinitarian Gets BELTED On The Metaphysics Of The Trinity
The case is decided
It wasArslan.
Arslan forced Austin to clarify that the Son's necessary metaphysical independence is predicated of the divine nature, not the person, undercutting Austin's own earlier admission that the Son as person is necessarily independent. This concession, extracted at [1177s], exposed an internal inconsistency Austin could not resolve. Arslan also pressed the identity-transitivity objection effectively, with Austin failing to answer how numerically distinct persons can each be numerically identical to the one divine essence without generating three gods.
Why Arslan won
- [1052s] Arslan lays out the contradiction: because Austin agrees the Son is necessarily metaphysically independent in all possible worlds, yet admits the Son in the human nature is dependent, the Son would be both independent and dependent in the same sense, which is impossible.
- [1177s] Austin admits that when he says 'the Son is necessarily metaphysically independent,' the term 'Son' picks out the divine nature, not the person. This directly contradicts his earlier agreement at [991s] where the subject was the person, showing an equivocation that unravels his position.
- [2060s] Arslan argues that if the three persons are each numerically identical to the one divine nature and are numerically distinct from each other, then by counting by nature there would be three divine natures and thus three gods, which Austin's responses about subsistent relations did not adequately refute.
Where Austin scored
- [1115s] Austin points out that the agreed-upon necessary independence applies to the divine nature, and attempts to clarify that the Son's human nature does not impinge on his divine independence, but this fails because Arslan had already established the Son as person possesses both natures necessarily, making the person dependent in the human nature.
- [1638s] Austin offers the relational distinction model, arguing subsistent relations do not divide the divine essence, which is a recognized Scholastic defense, but he fails to show how this avoids the transitivity problem that Arslan raised.
Closest callWhether Austin's initial agreement that 'the Son is necessarily metaphysically independent' was about the person or the divine nature. At [991s] the statement was ambiguous, and Arslan later clarified it at [1177s], where Austin conceded it referred to the nature. That concession turned the debate firmly in Arslan's favor, but if Austin had consistently maintained it was always about the nature, it might have been a closer call.
Crowd verdict
1 voteThe model called this for Arslan. Who do you say won?
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